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Abstract

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 spawned 252 new nonprofit organizations. We know
little about these organizations, including how they emerged, formalized, met constituents’
expectations for immediate performance and ultimately survived. This paper explores these
issues through a case study of one successful organization, the Windows of Hope Family Relief
Fund. Using concepts from disaster, organizational ecology and entrepreneurship research, the
analysis identifies six propositions that link these literatures, notably the role of resource
acquisition in formalization and the role of legitimacy in both fund development and
organizational endurance. The study contributes new knowledge about the role of collaboration
in acquiring capacity to enhance responsiveness. The study’s findings suggest potential parallels
to the evolution of new nonprofit organizations in other contexts.
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Organic and Sustainable:
The Emergence, Formalization and Performance of a September 11th Disaster Relief
Organization
Emergent groups, particularly those that formalized and became nonprofit organizations, played
a major role in the response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. One indicator of this
phenomenon is the receipt of nonprofit tax exempt status, provided to disaster response
organizations through the expedited review process of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Their
records indicate that 252 such organizations received expedited exempt status and generated
nearly $700 million dollars in revenue between 2001 and 2002 (Campbell, 2009).
Researchers have written extensively about the emergence of organizational forms and
populations and the developmental challenges new organizations face. Stinchcombe’s (1965)
theory that new organizations face obstacles to survival early in their existence, which he
characterizes as a “liability of newness” has been a particular source of scholarly debate. The
liability of newness is important for understanding group emergence in response to disaster
because founders and the community members who benefit from emergent groups expect them
to be immediately operational and responsive to needs generated by the disaster; otherwise they
are not relevant actors in disaster response.
Previous research addresses how public and nonprofit organizations respond to disaster,
but that work has provided only limited discussion of the emergence of new groups that evolve
into formal nonprofit organizations, particularly those that emerge in response to acts of
terrorism, such as the September 11th attacks (Drabek & McEntire, 2002). Important questions
remain about these groups, including how they emerge, when they formalize and what conditions
3
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facilitate success. Understanding what makes it possible for organizations to succeed following
such events would be useful for the founders of nonprofit organizations established in other
contexts, given the well-established challenges they face in less turbulent environments. This
paper addresses these issues through an explanatory case study of an emergent group created
following the September 11th attacks, the Windows of Hope Family Relief Fund. The study
considers four questions:
1. How did the Windows of Hope Family Relief Fund emerge following the September 11th
attacks?
2. Why did Windows of Hope evolve from emergent group to formal organization?
3. How did Windows of Hope organize its work to respond quickly to its constituents?
4. How did Windows of Hope overcome the liability of newness?
Group Emergence Following Disaster and the Liability of Newness
Group emergence following disaster is well chronicled (Drabek, 1986; Drabek &
McEntire, 2002, 2003; Horton Smith, 1997; Stallings & Quarantelli, 1985; Voorhees, 2008);
however researchers have provided limited analysis of it as a phenomenon. Stallings and
Quarantelli’s (1985) seminal article about emergent groups define them as sets of individuals
who come together after a disaster to accomplish a new, collective goal. Group members may or
may not have worked together previously; however, they come together because they have made
sense of the disaster in a similar way and perceive similar remedial actions as necessary (Kendra
& Wachtendorf, 2006). The newness of both the relationships among group members and the
tasks establishes the group’s emergent nature. Emergent groups are often informal and last a
short time. They may engage in a wide range of activities, such as search and rescue, providing
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food to emergency responders and interorganizational coordination (Drabek, 1986; Stallings &
Quarantelli, 1985; Quarantelli, 1996; Voorhees, 2008). Disaster researchers note that the
evolution of emergent groups into formal organizations follows a sequential pattern. Founders
define the domain within which their work takes place, establish a division of labor, determine
how to acquire resources and pursue agreement on the actions needed to carry out their goals
(Kreps & Bosworth, 2006). Formalization of the emergent group occurs when “other
organizations recognize their work, legitimate the group’s function” (Stallings & Quarantelli,,
1985, p. 95), and when organizational structure and boundaries become clearly defined. The
September 11th, 2001 disaster generated many emergent groups that evolved into formal
organizations (Campbell, 2009).
Stinchcombe (1965, p. 148) famously identifies that “a higher proportion of new
organizations fail than old,” a challenge he characterizes as the “liability of newness.” He
identifies four primary reasons why young organizations struggle with survival. First, new
organizations place people in new roles. The people carrying out these roles must learn job tasks
on their own, relying on general knowledge, without the benefit of training from previous
incumbents. Second, starting a successful new organization requires its members to create
complex operational procedures, which have “high costs in time, worry, conflict and temporary
inefficiency” (Stinchcombe, 1965, p. 148). Resolving these operational challenges
disadvantages new organizations over established ones. Third, new organizations involve
relationships among people who have not worked together previously, which makes it more
likely that workers in the new organization will not trust each other as much as workers in
existing organizations. Finally, new organizations do not have “stable ties to those who use
organizational services” (Stinchcombe , 1965, p. 149). Without those ties, customers or those in
5
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need of the services the new organization is providing, have no clear incentive to use the new
organization instead of an established one.
Researchers have provided strong empirical support for the notion that new organizations
are at significant risk for failure (Carroll & Hannan, 2000; Hannan, 1998; Hannan & Freeman,
1989), particularly nonprofit organizations (Bielefeld, 1993; Chambré & Fatt, 2002; Hager,
Galaskiewicz & Larson, 2004; Singh, Tucker & House, 1986). In recent years, researchers have
focused on factors that exacerbate or mitigate the liability of newness. Several have found a
“liability of scarcity,” arguing that organizational failure is negatively related to resource levels
(Chambré & Fatt, 2002; Freeman, Carroll & Hannan, 1983; Hager, et al; 2004; Hannan, 1998);
resources are particularly critical in the first year of operation (Hannan, 1998). Other researchers
have paid considerable attention to the role legitimacy plays in organizational survival.
Organizations succeed because other actors in the environment acknowledge them as legitimate.
In particular, linkages to the broader environment, reflected by level of donated income and
volunteer support, enhance survival chances (Hager, et al. 2004). External legitimacy plays a
more important role in the initial success of organizations than aspects of an organization’s
internal operations (Singh, et al., 1986).
Research on the liability of newness often involve analyses of organizations over a longer
period of time than the one to two-year lifespan of many groups that emerge following a disaster
(Campbell, 2009). Entrepreneurship research offers more applicable insights in its focus on
nascent entrepreneurs and the early stages of new enterprises (Aldrich & Martinez, 2001;
Reynolds & White, 1997; Tornikoski & Newbert, 2007). These researchers also emphasize
legitimacy, particularly as a means by which new ventures acquire the resources to operate. The
challenge facing nascent entrepreneurs is to convince others to engage in exchanges with their
6
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enterprise. This challenge is similar to those facing new nonprofit organizations which seek
philanthropic contributions as start-up capital. Researchers have identified characteristics of
entrepreneurs that make nascent enterprises legitimate to investors, notably, that they are
“trustworthy” and have “skills” (Low & Srivatsan, 1994); or that they are “competent, efficient,
effective and worthy, appropriate and or needed” (Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002, p. 416). Others
argue that strategic legitimacy, active engagement in “convincing external audiences that the
organization is operational” is critical to the success of new ventures (Tornikoski & Newbert,
2007, p. 312). Researchers appear to agree that establishing legitimacy is important; however
they lack consensus regarding what constitutes legitimacy, as Zimmerman and Zeitz (2002)
assert “legitimacy ultimately exists in the eye of the beholder” (p. 416).
Research Methods
This project follows the case study strategy outlined by Yin (2009). The study’s focus
was the early life of the Windows of Hope Family Relief Fund. Its founders established the
organization immediately following the September 11th terrorist attacks, and it quickly evolved
from an emergent group into a formal organization. Yin (2009, p. 47) notes that single-case
studies are useful in representing “unique” phenomena, such as Windows of Hope’s unusual
success as an emergent disaster response organization. In that way, an analysis of the
organization can provide important insights into this study’s research questions.
Case study data came from two primary sources: interviews with the
organization’s founders and review of archival material. Interviewees included the
organization’s executive director, three trustees and two primary advisors. Materials reviewed
included the organization’s first annual report, board meeting minutes, fund raising material,

7

Organic and Sustainable
collaborative agreements and a five-year report prepared for donors and other interested parties.
The author worked directly with the founders of the organization, as a senior staff member at the
Community Service Society of New York (CSS) with which Windows of Hope closely
collaborated. Documents from CSS defining its relationship with Windows of Hope, were also
reviewed. Finally, the author participated in many discussions with Windows of Hope staff and
trustees in the year following its creation. Notes collected as a participant observer were also
used as data for the study.
Windows of Hope Family Relief Fund
The Windows of Hope Family Relief Fund was founded by hospitality industry
professionals to meet the needs of the120 families of hospitality industry workers who died in
the September 11th attack on the World Trade Center. The group took its name from Windows
on the World, the restaurant at the top of the World Trade Center. The restaurant was wellknown and a popular attraction given its panoramic views of metropolitan New York. Since
2001, the organization has raised over $22 million dollars. It has used its resources to provide
financial assistance, health insurance and education support to its beneficiaries. The Fund
expects to continue to provide education support until the youngest children of those who died
complete college, in 2024. An executive director, three trustees, and several additional advisors
have led the organization.
Case Description
Founder Motivations and Group Emergence
The founders of Windows of Hope described several related concerns that motivated
them to pursue collective action in response to the World Trade Center attack. They all knew
8
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people at Windows on the World who died in the attack; all of those relationships were based in
experiences within the hospitality industry, as colleagues or employers. The founders expressed
concern about particular challenges the victims’ families would face. They knew that many of
the survivors were immigrants, including a significant number of children. They worried that
immigrant families lacked local social networks to deal with the stresses created by the loss of a
wage-earning family member. In addition, founders feared that the families of low-skilled
workers, immigrants in particular, would not be adept at navigating the assistance systems
created to meet victim needs. Similarly, the founders were concerned that those systems would
neglect hospitality industry workers at the expense of other, higher profile victim groups. This
last concern reflects the founders’ identity as hospitality industry professionals. Founders
consistently described their motivation for action in familial terms. One characterized his
involvement as an indication of “a proprietary feeling” in the hospitality industry, describing his
effort as “an extension of the restaurant industry family” in which “we take care of our people by
our rules.” Another framed his interest similarly, as “an opportunity for us to give back to our
family. It’s the spirit of hospitality.”
Three distinct experiences brought the founders together and led to the group’s
emergence. The first draws upon the experiences of those founders who were most closely
connected to Windows on the World. The restaurant’s owners co-owned a second restaurant, in
midtown Manhattan. In the days immediately following the attack, family members of the 79
people who died at Windows on the World converged on the second restaurant, in search of final
paychecks and any assistance the staff there could provide. Its co-owner—one of the founders of
Windows of Hope—commented “we could see that cooks and waiters’ families had come here
looking for paychecks; they were living paycheck to paycheck. Most people needed cash; [they
9
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were] immigrants with kids and no English.” This experience re-enforced that group’s
understanding of the challenges facing the families of those who had died and led them to
consider ways of assisting them.
A different experience drew in another founder. She was a public-relations professional
in the hospitality industry who had plans to coordinate an event at Windows on the World on the
afternoon of the World Trade Center attack. In the days immediately following the disaster, she
focused on volunteer activities defined by her experience in the hospitality industry. She cooked
with other professionals to provide food to rescue workers and volunteers, and came together
with other hospitality industry professionals who worked in her office. They shared ongoing
concerns about the families of the hospitality industry workers who had died and sought to take
action in response.
Another Windows of Hope founder experienced similar motivations but became involved
in a different way. He recalled feeling an immediate concern for the workers at Windows on the
World on September 11th. He worried about a friend who worked there and about “all the
busboys and cooks [he] had referred there over time.” He also worried about the kinds of
struggles their families would face, and their limited financial resources. His initial response was
to commit to doing something with other hospitality industry professionals. He noted “I thought
of a fund raiser; that’s what chefs do,” and he described calling colleagues with such urgency
that his “ears were raw.” His initial vision was that “the industry” would “work to support” the
families of those who had died. To carry out this vision, he planned a meeting at his restaurant
on September 14th. The founders described this meeting as a call to bring together everyone in
the hospitality industry who wanted to help families from their industry affected by the attack.
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The founders agreed that the September 14th meeting was a defining moment in the
group’s emergence. The founder who called the meeting used his network of industry
professionals to bring together all those interested in taking action. The meeting included a wide
variety of hospitality industry leaders, such as restaurant owners, chefs and food and beverage
distributors. Those in attendance agreed to form a group, defined as hospitality industry
professionals, to assist the families of those from their industry who were killed in the attack.
The group further defined its effort in industry terms by using the hospitality industry as its
primary mechanism for fund raising. The founders agreed to sponsor a fund raising event they
named “Dine Out,” that invited restaurant owners around the world to donate ten percent of the
income they received on October 11, 2001, the one month anniversary of the attack. This
strategy re-enforced the group’s focus on hospitality industry victims and the obligation of
workers in that industry to each other.
The founders indicated that the well developed network of industry professionals
committed to this project made it possible for the fund raising event to succeed. Members of the
group used their networks to encourage restaurant participation locally, nationally and
internationally. This effort was seen as the payoff for years of industry networking. The
founders and others involved in the group enlisted a wide range of colleagues. One founder
described it as “kind of like an inside job. It’s an old boys’ network; I knew I could count on
others. I had done years of traveling food shows.” The October 11th fund raiser generated much
more revenue than the founders expected. Within three weeks, the group had received more than
six million dollars, and by March 31, 2002, the organization had received over seventeen million
dollars, despite not having conducted any additional fund raising events.
From Emergent Group to Formal Organization
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When the founders established themselves as a group, following the September 14th
meeting, they viewed their effort as informal, a way to respond quickly to provide emergency
assistance to the families of hospitality industry workers. One founder described the initial
approach as “just a one-off donation,” that the founders would receive donations, distribute them
and the effort would be complete. The group took advantage of the Internal Revenue Service’s
rules expediting reviews of applications for tax exempt status for groups formed in response to
the September 11th terrorist attack. They pursued this course of action not as an effort to
formalize, but as a means to encourage donations. The group’s founders indicated “we didn’t
intend to create an organization,” but they pursued the federal tax exemption because “we
needed the capacity to receive donations.”
The founders’ identified three ways in which their perspective changed after the
unexpected success of the Dine Out event , each of which reflected a reconsideration of the
assumptions of informality that had guided the group to that point. First, the founders felt more
accountable. They recognized that having raised considerable resources, they would receive
greater scrutiny from donors, the public and the families who were the intended beneficiaries.
Founders noted they “needed to become incredibly responsible” and “more custodial, that we
would be under more scrutiny.” Second, they re-evaluated what was possible and adjusted their
strategy based on their increased capacity to address family needs. One commented that the
founders learned that families had “more issues than emergency dollars” and the group was now
able to do more to address them. Finally, the founders acknowledged that while they had the
network and skills to raise funds, they lacked the expertise to utilize those funds effectively.
They worried that they lacked the knowledge to provide proper assistance to families, as one
commented, “we didn’t know how to do it, we’re cooks.”
12
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The founders pursued collaboration with two established institutions as its primary
approach to addressing these concerns. This strategy enabled the founders to create immediate
capacity and to be responsive to the purposes for which they formed. To manage the large
volume of donations they received, they collaborated with a local accounting firm, known to the
founders because it had provided accounting services for one of the founder’s businesses. The
accounting firm was able to process donations quickly and provide financial reports to the
founders.
To develop and implement a plan for assisting families, the founders sought counsel from
the leader of a well known New York City philanthropy. That person suggested that the
founders collaborate with an established nonprofit social service organization to compensate for
their lack of experience. They were ambivalent about this course of action at first; they felt
protective of their resources and worried that they would not find an organizational partner that
shared their passion for their mission. Ultimately, however, they were convinced that their lack
of expertise in social services necessitated collaboration. The founders also wanted to create an
intermediary between themselves and individuals requesting assistance—some of whom they
knew personally. They wanted a professional social service organization to assess requests for
assistance and make recommendations to the Windows of Hope leadership, to reduce potential
conflicts of interest.
The partner organization, the Community Service Society, provided Windows of Hope
with access to infrastructure and expertise. CSS had case management staff available to meet
with victims’ family members and implement the founders’ decisions to distribute emergency
assistance. In addition, because CSS had provided financial assistance to needy families for
many years, its case managers were able to adapt policies and procedures to ensure fund
13
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distributions were consistent with the purpose of Windows of Hope and the intent of donors,
thereby strengthening accountability.
Finally, the acquisition of resources also led the founders of Windows of Hope to
reconsider their overall strategy. Their original plan was to raise money and immediately
distribute it to victims’ families; however, the founders revised that plan after their resource
situation changed. The founders reassessed family circumstances and determined that families
had long-term needs. As a result, they decided not to distribute all the resources they had
generated immediately. Instead, they chose a short-term course of action, while they developed
long-term plans. The short-term course of action involved the provision of emergency financial
assistance, with an emphasis on education and health care. To develop a long-term plan, the
founders used the professional expertise of staff at the Community Service Society to assess
family needs and make recommendations for action. Ultimately, the founders committed to pay
victims’ families health insurance for five years and education expenses for all victims’ families
until the youngest children of those who died completed their undergraduate education. They
made this choice because other relief organizations did not guarantee education or health
insurance (at least initially), and because they believed that education was the most effective way
to respond to the challenges created by the death of a parent or spouse in the attack. The
founders also believed that this approach honored the wishes many of the workers who died had
for their families, particularly those who were immigrants to the United States. The founders
communicated this plan to their donors who were generally supportive. The development of this
approach to assistance indicates that instead of the emergence of an ephemeral group,
distributing a modest amount of financial assistance, the acquisition of resources led the founders
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to formalize and develop a longer-term vision for the new entity as an organization.

Table one

provides a timeline of key events in the emergence of Windows of Hope.
<Table 1 About Here>
Discussion
This case allows us to synthesize concepts from disaster research and organizational
ecology to deepen our understanding of organizations that emerge in response to disaster. The
Windows of Hope story illustrates the process of group emergence and formalization, consistent
with Stallings & Quarantelli’s (1985) description of such processes. The case indicates that
perceived legitimacy, defined in institutional theory and used in organizational ecology and
entrepreneurship research, was a critical element in the success of Windows of Hope, enabling
its leaders to acquire resources and accomplish key goals. Most important, the case indicates
how the founders of Windows of Hope overcame liability of newness challenges to respond
quickly to the needs of their constituents. The experience of the founders of the organization
helps us to understand their success and identify lessons for those who establish such
organizations in the future.
At first, Windows of Hope looks like many other groups that emerge following disasters:
a group of individuals come together in new relationships to respond to the consequences of a
disaster. What distinguishes the founders of Windows of Hope, however, is that while the postdisaster relationships in which they engaged were new, all those associated with it defined
themselves as hospitality industry workers concerned for other hospitality industry workers. In
fact, the founders of the organization were familiar with each other, at least by reputation, prior
to the group’s emergence. This characteristic was critical to the group’s success.
15
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In addition, the organization’s founders had well-established networks in the hospitality
industry. The September 14th meeting which established the group’s mission and strategy
included approximately fifty industry leaders, extending the founders’ network further. The
group’s focus on the families of hospitality workers killed at the World Trade Center and their
definition of their work as an industry response created an immediate constituency for the group
among hospitality industry workers internationally. In fact, the high profile of the September
11th attack allowed the founders to leverage their networks to generate support for the group’s
efforts. The effective use of these networks reflects the importance of weak ties, a concept used
in network theory to explain how individuals and groups acquire capital (Granovetter, 1983).
The loose connections among group members made it possible for them to involve an unusually
wide network of individuals in their effort. These circumstances are consistent with the
legitimation activities Stallings and Quarantelli (1985) associate with the evolution of emergent
groups into formal organizations.
Because Windows of Hope’s leaders defined their primary goal as financial assistance to
victim’s families, the group pursued acquisition of financial resources. The group’s fund raising
success is consistent both with institutional theory and research on nascent entrepreneurs that
funders will support individuals they perceive as legitimate. The founders’ successful navigation
of the Internal Revenue Service’s expedited tax exemption review process and the speed with
which they incorporated legitimated them further. The seventeen million dollars the founders
raised in their first nine months is evidence that industry professionals perceived the founders as
legitimate. Internal Revenue Service data indicate that only four organizations created in
response to the September 11th terrorist attack generated more resources in that time. These
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findings suggest that institutional theory’s claims about the conditions necessary for
organizations to acquire resources apply in this case.
The relationship the case establishes between resource acquisition and the evolution from
emergent group to formal organization is also significant. The founders of Windows of Hope
expected to establish an informal group that provided immediate assistance to a discrete set of
individuals in the aftermath of the attack. The acquisition of resources changed their perspective
and led to the decision to formalize. The perceived legitimacy of the founders was a necessary
condition for acquiring resources; however, it was the consequences of resource acquisition that
led the group to move beyond the informal ideas that characterized its emergence. This
emphasis on the role of resource acquisition adds to Stallings & Quarantelli’s (1985) discussion
of the importance legitimacy plays in the formalization process.
Securing resources eliminated that issue as a threat to the organization’s immediate
survival (the “liability of scarcity”). As such, the case is consistent with previous research about
the importance of resources in general (Freeman et al., 1983; Hannan, 1998), donated resources
in particular (Hager, et al 2004) and external legitimacy (Singh et al., 1986) in addressing the
liability of newness. Windows of Hope emerged with little expectation of long-life; however,
the founders’ decision to formalize and its endurance are attributable to these factors. These
findings matter because they indicate that disaster response organizations, regardless of the
context within which they emerge, must meet the same conditions as other new organizations if
they are to survive.
It is as important, however, to note what Windows of Hope’s leaders did to become
responsive quickly, after they acquired operating resources. The demand for immediate
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responsiveness distinguishes groups that emerge following disasters from groups that emerge at
other times. One way to analyze what the founders of Windows of Hope did is to reconsider
their actions in terms of the four liabilities that Stinchcombe (1965) argues affects the
performance of new organizations. To be responsive following a disaster requires new
organizations to overcome those liabilities quickly. Two of the liabilities were mitigated by
conditions that existed at the creation of Windows of Hope. First, the founders’ relative
familiarity with each other minimized the challenge posed by having to work with relative
strangers; in this case, the parties began with some trust and shared history. Second, Stinchombe
notes that founders lack ties to the users of the products or services the organization creates;
however, the Windows of Hope founders had professional relationships with many of the
families of hospitality industry workers who died on as a result of the September 11th disaster.
Further, none of the families of those affected by the disaster had previous ties to existing relief
organizations.
Environmental conditions did not mitigate the two other liabilities Windows of Hope
faced. The first relates to the establishment of new roles needed to carry out the work of the
organization; the second involves their implementation. To address these liabilities, the founders
took direction action. The founders’ strategy to acquire capacity through collaboration with
established partners was critical to their success. Leveraging the infrastructure of existing
organizations—and acquiring their knowledge and skills—lessened the burden of developing and
implementing new roles and structures. The founders acknowledged gaps in their expertise and
took steps to address them. Giving up control was difficult, but it enabled the organization to
respond quickly. This finding suggests that collaboration or related strategies to acquire
capacities can mitigate the liability of newness and contribute to the success of new
18
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organizations. This notion appears particularly appropriate for organizations created in response
to disaster for which immediate responsiveness is a condition of success.
Yin (2009, p. 15) notes, case studies are “generalizable to theoretical propositions and not
to populations or universes.” Table 2 summarizes propositions derived from the case and
identifies their implications and connection to existing theory. These propositions provide a
foundation for future research about the development of emergent groups established in response
to disaster, and its findings may be studied across populations of emergent disaster response
groups. For example, we would benefit from greater knowledge about whether resource
acquisition consistently leads to formalization or longevity. We do not know whether other
factors, such as a group’s purpose, affect its development, regardless of resources. Further,
catastrophic disasters, such as the September 11th terrorist attack, generate significant
philanthropic responses. It would be useful to learn more about donors’ decisions to contribute
to emergent groups, to determine whether legitimacy is the determining factor in donation
decisions. Finally, there may be value in research comparing organizations that emerge in
response to disaster with nonprofit organizations established in other contexts, to learn whether
there are meaningful differences in their development and whether the accelerated expectations
for the former hold lessons for the latter.
<Table 2 About Here>
Conclusion
This study deepens our understanding of the emergence, formalization and performance
of new groups created following disaster. The Windows of Hope case synthesizes concepts
taken from disaster, organizational ecology and entrepreneurship research and adds to our
19
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knowledge in its identification of the important role collaboration plays in acquiring capacity
quickly. Windows of Hope emerged as other groups in response to disaster, engaging people in
new relationships and tasks. The group sought resources and acquired them due to its perceived
legitimacy. Resource acquisition encouraged formalization and contributed to the organization’s
endurance. The organization responded in a timely way to its constituents needs because its
leaders pursued collaboration with existing organizations to acquire capacity. While emergent
groups founded in response to disaster are the focus of this research, it may be useful to study
whether there are parallels between the evolution of these groups and nonprofit organizations
established in other contexts.
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Table 1: Key Events in the Emergence and Formalization of Windows of Hope
Date
9/11/01-9/13/01

9/14/01
10/11/01
10/01-11/01
10/01-3/02
1/02-4/02
4/02

Activity
Founders engage in volunteer and initial organizing activity
Family members of Windows on the World killed in the attack seek assistance
at owners’ second restaurant.
New group emerges at fund raising meeting.
“Dine Out” fund raising event generates over $6 million dollars.
Collaboration with CSS and accounting firm initiated.
Windows of Hope provides emergency assistance to victims’ families.
Windows of Hope generates an additional $11 million dollars.
XYZ organization assesses family needs and recommends action to founders.
Founders dedicate resources to long-term education and health insurance
needs of victims’ families.
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Table 2: Summary of Case Study Findings and Implications for Theory
Finding
Hospitality industry professionals
came together in response to the
September 11th terrorist attack to
form a new group in a new
relationship with each other to
accomplish new collective goals.

The new group pursued resources
to accomplish its goals.
The perceived legitimacy of the
leaders of Windows of Hope made
it possible for the group to
generate resources.
The acquisition of significant
resources encouraged the leaders
of Windows of Hope to create a
formal organization.
The acquisition of resources made
it possible for Windows of Hope
to endure.
The perceived legitimacy of
Windows of Hope made it
possible for the organization to
endure.
Collaboration with established
organizations enabled Windows of
Hope to overcome impediments to
effective performance.

Implications
Consistent with literature on
group emergence in response to
disaster (Kendra &
Wachtendorf, 2006; Stallings
& Quarantelli, 1985).
Industry affiliation provided
basis for success.
Consistent with literature on
the formalization of emergent
groups created in response to
disaster (Kreps & Bosworth,
2006).
Consistent with institutional
theory and research on nascent
entrepreneurs generally.
Elaborates Stallings &
Quarantelli’s (1985) discussion
of the role resources play in
formalization.
Consistent with empirical
research on the liabilities of
newness and scarcity.
Consistent with empirical
research on legitimacy and the
liability of newness, notably
Singh, et al. (1985).
Builds on liability of newness
research, particularly as it
applies to organizations created
in response to disaster.
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Propositions
Unrelated individuals
come together in
response to disaster to
form new groups
andcarry out new tasks to
accomplish new
collective goals.

Emergent groups pursue
resources to accomplish
goals.
Resource acquisition
depends on the perceived
legitimacy of the leaders
of emergent groups.
Resource acquisition
encourages formalization.
Resource acquisition is
positively related to
organizational endurance.
Legitimacy is positively
related to organizational
endurance.
Collaboration with
established organizations
enables emergent
organizations to
overcome impediments to
effective performance.

